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Gott spricht allenthalben mit den Worten des Menschen. Und der Geist ist dies, daß 
der Übersetzende, der Vernehmende und Weitergebende, sich dem Ersten, der das Wort 
sprach und empfing, gleich weiß. Der Geist leitet so den Menschen und gibt ihm das 
Zutrauen, auf seinen eignen Füßen zu stehn. Grade als Geist der Überlieferung und 
Übersetzung ist er des Menschen eigner Geist.
Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung2
What guides my own attempt at translating between two Ger-
man-Jewish thinkers, Franz Rosenzweig and Hannah Arendt, 
and what gives this attempt the confidence to stand on its own 
two feet is a conviction that the Spirit lives off and in transmis-
sion. Moreover, if this transmission seems to be clandestine, the 
whole process becomes much more obscure, even though it 
occurs exclusively “with the words of man”. But if we agreed on 
the schema of clandestine transmission that would have occurred 
between Rosenzweig’s Der Stern der Erlösung (1921) and Arendt’s 
Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin (1929), then these two books could 
1 The text was written under the Etiuda 4 research grant financed by the Natio-
nal Science Center, Poland, grant No. 2016/20/T/HS1/00244. It is a part of the 
doctoral dissertation entitled Cryptotheological Defence of the Secular: Hannah 
Arendt’s Anthropology and the Secularisation Thesis. The author was a participant 
of the Inter-University Program of Interdisciplinary PhD Studies at the “Artes 
Liberales” Academy and defended the dissertation in May 2019 at the Faculty of 
“Artes Liberales” at the University of Warsaw.
2 Rosenzweig 1921: 460. For English translation see Rosenzweig [2005: 388 (here-
after as SR)].
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surprisingly mirror each other. My confidence is also supported 
by Hannah Arendt’s own words in her paper about Martin Buber 
written in French in 1935. There, she stated that translation could 
prepare – as Marie Luise Knott put it – “a new home for an alien 
spirit” [Knott 2013: 32], going through an “oddly circuitous path” 
[Arendt 2007: 32]3.
Before entering the kingdom of ghosts and spirits, one has to 
prepare a short account of historical relations between both think-
ers. Neither in Arendt’s books nor in her correspondence, nor in 
her biography [Young-Bruehl 2004], can any essential remark 
about Franz Rosenzweig be found. Only Dans le pas de Hannah 
Arendt by Laure Adler contains a brief hint that Arendt had read 
Der Stern der Erlösung before she wrote her doctoral dissertation 
[Adler 2005: 34], implying a possible impact that Der Stern could 
have exercised on the mind of the young Hannah Arendt. In my 
opinion, some facts make this possibility less unlikely: 1. Arendt 
belonged to a group of the most outstanding young intellectuals 
and at the time of her youth, the academic circles were narrower 
than today. For that reason, it was easier for a great publication 
to affect the whole philosophical society, at least to the extent 
that the majority of the professional circles knew about it; 2. Her 
first husband was a colleague of Gershom Scholem and a cousin 
of Walter Benjamin. Both Benjamin and Scholem regarded Der 
Stern as a masterpiece and were under its influence in the 1920s; 
3. Arendt could have been aware of Rosenzweig since she knew 
and was impressed by Martin Buber’s work, with whom Rosen-
zweig translated the Bible4; 4. Studying theology, she could have 
heard about the book from theologians; 5) As well as from Leo 
Strauss whom she got to know in the inter-war period and who 
was himself impressed by Rosenzweig’s endeavour. 
3 A belief in translation as the secular act of a potentially messianic resonance could 
have haunted Hannah Arendt who wanted to edit a volume about translation in 
Schocken, collecting texts of, for instance, Rosenzweig, Benjamin, and Broch 
[see Knott 2013: 42].
4 However, one may still insist that the text where Arendt mentioned Rosenzweig 
as the co-translator of the Bible [Arendt 2007: 32], namely Un guide de le jeunesse: 
Martin Buber, appeared in 1935, meaning after completing Der Liebesbegriff.
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The above notwithstanding, even if any direct influence was 
excluded as historically possible but unauthenticated, some schol-
ars have already emphasized structural similarities between both 
thinkers, as well as many affined motives they discussed [see Ben-
sussan 1998; Leibovici 2003; Young-ah Gottlieb 2003; Brandes 
2010]. I will follow this path, proposing here the Arendtian reading 
of Rosenzweig, which means that I am going to imagine what reac-
tions Der Stern could have provoked in a young student preparing 
materials for her doctoral dissertation and looking for resources to 
criticise her famous teacher, Martin Heidegger5. Although written 
under auspices of Karl Jaspers as the supervisor, the dissertation 
was visibly influenced by Heidegger and constituted an attempt to 
contest his conceptual language while using it and by detaching it 
from its original context. 
To put it succinctly, Arendt analysed the concept of love in 
the writings of Augustine of Hippo in order to find internal con-
tradictions in his thought which had been developed between 
two poles of inspiration, Greek philosophy and the Judeo-Chris-
tian Bible. In the first chapter, Arendt presented the conception 
of subjectivity which starts from an isolated individual as futile. 
This conception very much resembles the Heideggerian Dasein 
confronted with death (and also, incidentally, the barricaded Selbst 
of Rosenzweig). A certain resolution appeared in the next two 
chapters of Arendt’s dissertation, which depict the individual as 
indebted to the world – the phenomenon created by and com-
5 Margaret Canovan’s well-known interpretation of Arendt constitutes an example 
of this omission: she claims that the concept of the world was rooted in Arendt’s 
thinking thanks to Augustine and Heidegger, whose impacts counterbalanced 
each other [Canovan 1992: 8]. However, if one only accepts Harold Bloom’s 
theory of creativity – which teaches that the most important influences could be 
the ones which the author hides and/or represses [Bloom 1973] – then it would 
be more obvious why Arendt may have needed Rosenzweig – namely to combat 
her teacher’s overwhelming way of thinking. Nevertheless, she was independent 
enough to also distance herself from Rosenzweig. As for Heidegger’s importance, 
I agree with Mavis Louise Biss that although his influence on Arendt’s disserta-
tion is indubitable, overemphasizing it – whether one thinks she questioned it or 
not – “do[es] not say anything about who she was thinking with” [Biss 2012: 762]. 
This lacuna I intend to fill. 
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posed of others. In her method of criticising Augustine one can 
decipher the “strong Hebraic resonances” [Celermajer 2011: 3] 
in a double sense: not only did she emphasise fragments where 
the Church Father abandoned the Biblical perspective [Arendt 
1996: 12 (hereafter as LA)], but she also pointed allusively to the 
problem of the exclusion of the Jews from the Christian definition 
of the neighbour6.
This could have been derived from Franz Rosenzweig, who 
insisted on an indissoluble bond relating Christians to the persis-
tence of the Jews in their faith. Of course, it could have also had 
different provenances, but a hypothesis of Rosenzweigian shadow 
behind Arendt’s crypto-Judaic reading of the Christian dogmas is 
tempting for various reasons; it is not limited to an abstract com-
parative exercise. Both thinkers belong to a certain ephemeral 
epoch when philosophy and theology formed a difficult coalition 
because of the deep historical crisis. Rosenzweig called the hybrid 
discipline born between two speculative languages “the new think-
ing” (das neue Denken). I claim that if he still represented the the-
ological pole, Hannah Arendt as Rosenzweig’s critical follower 
shifted more to the philosophical register, preserving everything 
that could be saved after secularisation or even a double secu-
6 For this reason alone, it is hard to agree with Hans Jonas, who wrote in his 
memories: “My dissertation topic, gnosticism, was potentially a thousand times 
more political than Hannah Arendt’s, the concept of love in Augustine” [ Jonas 
2008: 70]. It is apart from the fact that she was, like many other fellow students 
whom Jonas described, deeply apolitical and sought in philosophy a refuge from 
the contemporary pressing political issues [ Jonas 2008: 69-70]. “A comparable 
example might be the early Christians, who turned their backs on the world 
or went into the desert to escape the world and to seek to perfect themselves 
in direct contact with God – that was philosophy for Hannah Arendt” [ Jonas 
2008: 69]. In my opinion, which stands in contradiction to Jonas’ claim, Arendt’s 
reflection on the negligence of singularity, which was legitimised on the basis of 
ontotheology of hierarchy and order, as well as her interest in the universal origin 
of social bond, made her a meta-political, cryptotheological thinker from her earliest 
years as an intellectual. By the way, Jonas left an interesting memory which could 
correct the general vision that Arendt was “politicised” by Kurt Blumenfeld and, 
later, by Heinrich Blücher. Initially, it was her first husband, Günther Stern, who 
involved her with politics; Jonas characterised him as “developing into a leftist 
social critic” [ Jonas 2008: 68].
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larisation. In other words, she rescued from the flaming house 
of theology the most precious phenomena which could later be 
smuggled into a seemingly pure philosophy. Her doctorate was 
the point at which this contraband was moved. 
My  analytic procedure will, however, consist in showing 
“Arendtian” places in Rosenzweig. I am going to present two of 
the most characteristic topics – the world and birth – exposing the 
points of convergence and divergence of both thinkers. The final 
part of this chapter will be devoted to the prospective relations 
between theology and philosophy resulting from the process of 
translation and transmission. 
1. The world
[…] we […] are creatures just on this account that we do not 
see the whole truth. Just for this reason we remain within the 
limits of mortality. Just for this reason – we remain. And we 
of course want to remain. We of course want to live. God does 
for us what we want as long as we want it. As long as we hang 
onto life, he gives us life. He gives us only as much of the truth 
as we can bear as living creatures, namely our share. If he gave 
us more, if he gave us his share, the whole truth, then he would 
lift us out of the bounds of humanity. But just as long as he 
does not do this, just so long we have no desire for it. We hang 
onto our creatureliness. We do not readily leave it. And our 
creatureliness is conditioned by ou[r] having only a share, are 
only a share. [SR: 439]
To explain this extremely dense and original quotation one needs 
to turn back to the motto opening this article, because both frag-
ments of Der Stern are complementary. First, the spirit of transmis-
sion does not guarantee truth but the coherence of the person who 
currently occupies the place of the translator. Second, although it 
is God who speaks through human languages, his speech is limited 
according to the earthly reality. The same occurs in the passage 
cited above. Behind God’s self-limitation stood the intention to 
meet men in the middle of the road and protect them from truth 
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which is incompatible with the world – created, mortal, human, 
finite. God is the possessor of truth and this guarantees that 
nobody on Earth will be able to possess it. It is a divine ban on 
sovereignty altogether. What is more, this fact discourages man 
and his theologies from a desire to reach the truth. This time it is 
not a ban, but precisely a discouragement.
Nothing else than that explains more aptly why Arendt fiercely 
opposed the metaphysical tradition and its nostalgic longing for 
the Wholeness. She demystified the pious wish of unification with 
God and the desire for being redeemed as soon as it is only possi-
ble as “pseudo-Christian” [LA: 30] and thanatic. According to her 
speculative provocations, it contradicts the goodness of Creation 
and the very condition of creatureliness. By contrast, in the Chris-
tian tradition, as Rosenzweig pointed out, because of its pagan or 
apocalyptic components, there is a tendency to push for salvation 
“too much”, immediately: a pagan tends towards fulfilment in unity 
and an apocalyptic towards fulfilment in destruction, but both 
paganism and apocalypticism disregard the limits of the individual 
and its fragile temporality. 
The quotation which I am discussing here transmits a wisdom 
that appears strange from the Christian point of view, namely, that 
a modest and honest relation towards God means first and fore-
most keeping distance from God. There is nothing blasphemous 
in this statement since it is the Other who protects our desires 
to keep them alive within certain boundaries. Confronted with 
infinity of time and space, life could lose its appetite for living, 
but “we of course want to live. God does for us what we want as 
long as we want it”. His lesson is not that we should not want “too 
much”, as traditionalist interpretation immediately understands 
the function of limitation. Instead, we should not strive for some-
thing which is out of our reach for the time being, like truth and 
salvation, if we want to live a happy and good life. In Benjamin 
Lazier’s wording:
Only out of some irreducible distance from God can meaning-
ful life emerge. Or as Jonas wrote toward the end of his life, 
God deserves praise not for his providence, but first for his 
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absence, as it is the condition for human mortality, for an 
emphatically human life. [Lazier 2008: 170]
Once again, the message that truth is unreachable does not prompt 
us to either seek it more strongly or regard humans as pathetic 
creatures. It  is just due to our incompleteness that the world 
remains still open and plural. Plurality as a precondition for action 
and action itself is, as Arendt later would say, ontologically rooted 
in the fact of birth, which for early Arendt still radiated with the 
light of Creation, albeit a reflected one, far from the fullness of 
glory. For Rosenzweig, this relation between birth and the Cre-
ator was more straightforward, but by no means direct. Just like 
Arendt asked in her dissertation, opposing ascetic negation of the 
world, “why should we make a desert out of this world?” [LA: 19], 
Franz Rosenzweig opens his discussion of the world by posing 
a question: “Why wasn’t the world understood as a multiplicity 
for example? Why precisely as a totality?” [SR: 18]. The world 
for him is “non-absolute” [SR: 22], not a unity since unity is only 
possible in logic. It does not imply that the world is a-logical, but 
“metalogical” in its plurality [SR: 20]. “The world itself is not the 
All: it is a homeland” [SR: 20], and in order to be a homeland for 
various peoples and different individuals, it had to spring from the 
original and irreducible plurality. 
Rosenzweig’s ontological proof of this foundational plurality 
rests on the “identity between thinking and being” which “presup-
poses an internal non-identity” [SR: 19]. He wrote:
Because it is at the same time related to itself, thinking, which 
is of course totally related to being, is simultaneously a mul-
tiplicity in itself. So thinking, moreover, which is itself the 
unity of its own internal multiplicity, establishes the unity of 
being, and certainly, it is not in the degree where it is a unity, 
but a multiplicity. [SR: 19]
The author suggested that honest searching for unity leads una-
voidably to the unity-in-multiplicity. Since the movement of going 
back to the origin – God the Creator – must necessarily pass 
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through a nebula of creatures which cannot be disregarded as 
contingent, their contingency is a discreet mark of divine cho-
senness. By going to salvation as an extraterrestrial reality, the 
world loses its gravity. On the contrary, by returning to creation in 
one’s imagination, the materiality of the world is being reinforced7. 
Consequently, if thinking wants to be at home in the world, it 
needs to transcend its overwhelming unity in order to concentrate 
on diversity, which is co-existent with this unity, thus preventing 
thinking from neglecting any element of this pair. Cryptotheolog-
ical thought never forgets about its own Adamite origin, dissem-
inated (“secularised”) into the multiplicity of human languages. 
Arendt’s famous definition of the world, positing that the 
world is nothing but action (praksis) and speech (leksis), could 
have been preceded, again, by Rosenzweig and not only derived 
from Greek philosophy. Rosenzweig claimed that the world is 
something “common to all, but such that each has his individual 
share in it, and his particular point of view” [SR: 89]. To this spatial 
dimension, Rosenzweig also added a linguistic one, defining the 
world as “a real lively to and fro connection of a conversation that 
goes back and forth” [SR: 90]. For him, the world does not exist 
without the word [SR: 312]; its reality depends on speaking, which 
of course implies plurality of voices8.
2. Birth
Closely related to the description of the world is the topic of birth. 
It is already present in the second chapter of Arendt’s doctoral 
dissertation, where she analysed the self ’s return to its own origin, 
which involves birth, all generations of ancestors, going back to 
Adam, the first man, and finally going into the nothingness of Cre-
7 This is where Eric Santner’s postulate concerning the aim of the new thinking 
initiated by Rosenzweig concretises. Namely, Santner states that materialism 
must encompass the dimension of Creation, that historical materialism has to 
overcome historicism with the help of theology [Santner 2005: 82].
8 Adriana Cavarero elaborated and extended Arendtian reflection about audible 
dimension of appearance, also referring to the works by Rosenzweig and Scho-
lem [Cavarero 2005].
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ation. There is no agreement among the scholars upon the source 
of Arendtian natalism. François Collin, for instance, indicated 
multi-faceted inspirations, not only Biblical, but also philosophical 
and mythological [Collin 1999: 188; cited in: Bárcena 2002: 110]. 
Nonetheless, this reorientation of the philosophical attention 
from one angle of finitude, namely death, to another – birth – is 
regarded as Hannah Arendt’s Kehre [Lütkehaus 2006: 27]. I would 
add that it was not, however, a turn in and of her thinking. Quite 
the contrary, her thinking erupted from the turn she made within 
philosophy.
Strangely enough, Rosenzweig is not mentioned as the precur-
sor of Arendt on this score, although his reflection on creatio ex 
nihilo, origins, different types of nothingness preceding creation, 
newness, and birth itself is quite impressive. There is also the topic 
of “the second birth” in Der Stern, which appeared in Arendt’s 
book on Rahel Varnhagen on a different level – not so much seen 
as rebirth of the conscious soul (which was Rosenzweig’s con-
cern), but rather as a possibility of changing social status. However, 
Arendt used the term “second birth” in the after-war period also 
for action, which to her seemed to be the renewal of the potential 
promised in the naked fact of birth. Until today, the status of the 
concept of natality has ignited controversies which, in my opinion, 
eventuate from its cryptotheological character. It is paradigmatic 
that a secular interpreter of Arendt, Samuel Moyn, blames her 
dissertation for being much too theological, especially concerning 
the conception of birth discussed within the context of Biblical 
Creation [Moyn 2008: 96]. 
But Moyn and others do not see the critical stance Arendt 
adopted when she allowed her language to be, so to speak, theo-
logically pigmented. First of all, as a general rule, throughout her 
writings she criticised theology at the same moment when she 
evoked it. Moreover, her appropriation of theology, like in the case 
of Rosenzweig, was selective and had a strong secularising effect. 
Most importantly, the final effect of her cryptotheological excur-
sions to the alien discursive areas resulted in an almost complete 
annihilation of theological traces. And because of that, one must 
sometimes resort to her private Denktagebuch, to her correspond-
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ence or to the memories of the people who knew her to see the 
bottom layer of this palimpsest. 
An example of particular importance would help to under-
stand the complex game Arendt conducted with her readers, leav-
ing allusions in the fragments most dear to her heart. She could 
not uncover a smuggled message in those fragments, because its 
resonance is stronger, providing that it is invisible at first glance. 
Thus, action – discussed in The Human Condition as ontologically 
rooted in the act of birth – finds its full explanation only through 
a simultaneous reading of her “notebook”. In the entry from the 
17th of April 1951, we encounter the phrase “sanctity of the human 
spontaneity [die Heiligkeit menschlicher Spontaneität]” [Arendt 
2002: 66], which for her was, as Ludger Lütkehaus stated, “literally 
sacrosanct” [Lütkehaus 2006: 37].
Nevertheless, we have to be aware that this was one of a few 
instances where Arendt called a spade a spade. What is more, it is 
as if she preserved only this one point as a link to theology from 
Rosenzweig’s whole system. It takes the form of the eye of the 
needle for theological motives. If they enter into the secular realm, 
their importance can be justly called metaethical, since Arendtian 
natalism does not evolve into ethics with univocal “pro-” or “anti-” 
suffix: “For metaethical was not in any case intended to mean 
a-ethical. It was not meant to express the absence of ethos, but 
only its unusual status, hence that passive position instead of the 
imperative position that is usually assigned to it” [SR: 20]9.
Rosenzweig’s view on birth is very close to the Arendtian one. 
He spoke about “the boundless surprise of birth” [SR: 238], “the 
mystery of the birth” [SR: 368], in constant reference to “the mir-
acle of individuality” [SR: 61], since for him factuality as such is 
miraculous [SR: 58]. Of course, this language is still much more 
theological10, whereas the passages about novitas gathered below 
9 This passive position of ethics could be translated into Arendt’s emphasis on 
persuasion in the public mode of discussing common issues.
10 As Daniel Brandes observed, what in Rosenzweig had still remained in the form 
of imperative through which the voice of God was audible, in Arendt – after 
secular translation – was transmitted as a promise [Brandes 2010: 19], or rather 
many promises, related to action, forgiveness, oath, covenants, and new political 
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sound often as they could have been written by Arendt herself – for 
example, when Rosenzweig wrote that “every earthly phenom-
enon is a new victory over the nothing, an event as glorious as 
on the first day” [SR: 54]. This sentence reveals an ontological 
structure, which also interested Arendt in her dissertation, where 
she reflected upon the double nothingness surrounding human 
life and distinguished between the two variants of nothingness 
[LA: 76].
Compared to Arendt, Rosenzweig remained less coherent in 
his reflection on birth, sometimes poisoned by deep pessimism, 
especially in the last part of Der Stern, where he seemed to aban-
don the formerly defended positions in order to flee and glide 
towards salvation. He started his book – mobilised by “a defiance 
of death” [SR: 346] – with a famous tirade against philosophy 
depicted as an ally of the forces explaining to the living human 
being that she is nothing while facing death. Yet in the first pages 
there is also an ambivalent image of coming into the world which 
already contains Schopenhauerian overtones: 
[…] every new birth multiplies the fear for a new reason, for 
it multiplies that which is mortal. The womb of the inexhaust-
ible earth ceaselessly gives birth to what is new, and each one 
is subject to death; each newly born waits with fear and trem-
bling for the day of its passage into the dark. [SR: 9]
On the other hand, in the whole first part of Der Stern, Rosenz-
weig fought against the sad wisdom of nihil novi sub sole, claim-
ing that “each new thing is a renewed negation of the nothing, 
something that has never been, a beginning for itself, something 
unheard of, something ‘new under the sun’” [SR: 53]. Additionally, 
he defended the “full miracle” of birth from the accusation that it 
is an endlessly repeatable effect of coupling, just a banal natural 
foundations. One may explain the difference by referring to Arendt’s essay from 
1930 on Rilke (co-authored with Günther Stern): for if the religious world of 
Judaism in particular (as well as of Christianity to a certain extent) is acoustic 
[Arendt 2007b: 3], as it was for Rosenzweig, in Arendt’s case one can’t even talk 
about an echo, but “the absence of an echo” [Arendt 2007b: 1].
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event. For Rosenzweig – who was interested in “life beyond the 
limits of the species” [SR: 81] and who found “a purely natural 
view of life” [SR: 79] insufficient to understand “another independ-
ent reality: the living human being” [SR: 15] as analogous to the 
“living God of life” [SR: 46] – the opposite was true, namely that 
birth contains the germs of “the unforeseen, of the unforeseeable”, 
which makes that “each birth is something absolutely new” [SR: 
57]. Like Arendt, Rosenzweig was aware that in order to break with 
the “cyclical process” [SR: 58] and end with the “dark violence 
[exercised – RZ] by the power of its species”, an individual needs 
a kind of earthly transcendence, which “concentrated entirely in the 
moment of birth” [SR: 57]. This is the only condition under which 
birth gets truly distinguished from death11. Consequently,
the faculty of bringing about new beginning, of creating new 
worlds, requires a cosmology not found in Greek thought. The 
shift to modal conceptions of action, then, required a shift in 
cosmology, […] which forms the basis of Arendt’s earliest 
systematic theory. [Clarke and Quill 2009: 258]
This shift would be one of the greatest achievements of the Jew-
ish intervention into modern philosophy, as Agata Bielik-Robson 
insistently argues [Bielik-Robson 2014].
Nonetheless, in the last part of his Der Stern, Rosenzweig 
returned to the vision of the world as a growing necropolis: “The 
mere inexhaustibility of begetting changes nothing in the perish-
ability of the world, indeed even increases it. […] The new thing 
that we are seeking must be a nunc stans, not a moment that flies 
away, but a ‘fixed moment’” [SR: 307]. It shows that even in Rosen-
zweig, who began with a defence of the finite being, at the end 
of the day the subject cannot stand the tensions of being mortal. 
As a consequence, the third part of Der Stern is full of practical 
11 Danielle Celermajer notes that one can find the same objection towards Greek 
metaphysics in Jewish thinkers as different as Maimonides and Rosenzweig. 
Greek tradition does not know a beginning and an end, thus leaving no space for 
true singularity which is creative, free and responsible for this freedom [Celer-
majer 2011: 6–7].
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measures which serve to “protect” the individual from “disorienta-
tion”: religious community, unity achieved in liturgy, higher order, 
and even revenge of nature. Conversely, in the third part of her 
dissertation, Arendt built the foundations for a secular community 
of believers, who already rely not on common belief, but common 
descent. The roads of both thinkers very much diverged in the 
end, precisely because of the apolitical character of Rosenzweig’s 
thinking [Gordon 2007: 855-878], which dismisses action, while 
Arendt was politically aware even in her reflections about God and 
the neighbour – not political topics per se. Paradoxically as it may 
sound, one could start tracing their divergence starting from the 
visions of God they were inclined to prefer. 
3. New thinking
I have already collected some characteristics of birth from Der 
Stern that one may also find in Hannah Arendt: the ontological 
foundation of human freedom, unpredictability, being its own 
beginning, uniqueness, antinaturalism. They are not general, but 
highly original and specific, which could suggest that Arendt read 
Rosenzweig’s masterpiece in the 1920s. As stated earlier, this does 
not exclude different sources of her conception of natalism, but 
still, she shared a lot with Rosenzweig when it comes to the onto-
logical grounding of worldly plurality emerging from the act of 
birth, each time new. 
Most importantly, “the illumination extends beyond Arendt 
herself to the transmission and trends of thought through the 
history of the West, and to the often hidden continuities in critical 
possibilities” [Celermajer 2011: 16]. Arendt was perfectly aware 
that what she was doing in her dissertation exceeded the case 
of one author. There had been many divergent currents of the 
tradition shaping the civilization that developed on the shores 
of the Mediterranean Sea, which had found its condensed and 
reformulated form in Augustine. He made himself a crossroads of 
them all, which is why his person and intellectual legacy appealed 
so much to Hannah Arendt, who was a figure from the crossroads 
as well. Absorbing German philosophy and Jewish secular sensi-
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tivity derived from Judaic religious heritage, she decided to intro-
duce her own difference through idiosyncratic re-readings of the 
well-known motives. Since I did not want to settle for a vague 
indication of “strong Hebraic resonances” [Celermajer 2011: 3], 
I decided to link Arendt’s name with Rosenzweig’s, to turn the 
transmission of the hidden tradition into a more personalised 
drama – the drama of two Jews who gave their non-normative 
Jewishness a meaning within their deep engagement with Chris-
tian theology, which for them partook of the main philosophical 
tradition of the West. Hence their own confusing style of writing 
reflecting confusions already accumulated throughout numerous 
historical processes of reception. 
Respecting Artemy Magun’s prudent warning against labelling 
certain theological motives as “Jewish” (in Arendt as well as in the 
case of other Jewish writers) if they can be found in Christian tra-
dition as well [Magun 2012: 559, 566], I will insist on the validity of 
searching for peculiarities linked exclusively with Jewish historical 
condition, especially with two-ply texture of the Marranic writings. 
A Marranic possibility is what Magun completely misses12. Thus, 
he finds specific satisfaction in pointing out that Buber and Rosen-
zweig were the readers of Hegel and Feuerbach, as if this fact could 
diminish the Jewish dimension of their response to German ideal-
ism. The complex transmissions I am trying to grasp following 
Jewish thinkers do not fit in a sandpit where Jewish and Christian 
children quarrel over (theological) toys and territory. Magun is 
therefore right to protest against overly strict divisions between 
the two traditions. Nonetheless, relying on the conviction that 
all the sources are impure, one could and should ask how much 
Jewish spirit remained within the Christian tradition (in Hegel 
and Feuerbach too) if one does not want to end up being unaware 
of la dette impensée [Zarader 1990]. 
12 Thus, he prefers staging a pulling the rope: “Richard Bernstein even uses Arendt’s 
insistence on the Other’s point of view as a proof of her unconscious sympathy 
for Judaism. But, as we’ve just seen, Arendt explicitly attributes this approach to 
Christianity, thus continuing in the footsteps of Feuerbach rather than Rosen-
zweig and Buber” [Magun 2012: 566]. Why not all of them together and – as 
always in Arendt – selectively? The reference concerns Bernstein’s Hannah Arendt 
and the Jewish Question [Bernstein 1996].
177Clandestine Transmission: Rosenzweig and Arendt
Thinking within solidified frames, we would not be able to 
notice that despite the shared theoretical moments, Arendt and 
Rosenzweig represent polarised views regarding the boundary 
between philosophy and theology. In the Western tradition, these 
two discourses have been interconnected for centuries. It was pre-
cisely at the time of German idealism that philosophy was meant 
to “re-translate” theology and religion into a secular conceptual 
language. Rosenzweig’s protest against this absorption led towards 
the “new thinking” which was a “re-introduction” of Biblical theol-
ogy into the philosophical domain enclosed within the immanent 
frame. He did not want to start a war again – on the contrary, his 
vision implied a peaceful exchange between the theologian and 
the philosopher: “They complete each other, and together they 
bring about a new type of philosopher or theologian, situated 
between theology and philosophy” [SR: 116]. Rosenzweig tried 
his best to avoid temptation of the domination of one discourse 
over another: 
From the theological point of view, what philosophy must 
accomplish for it is not a sort of re-construction of theological 
content, but its anticipation or, more accurately, its foundation, 
the exhibiting of the pre-conditions on which this content 
rests. [SR: 117]
Rosenzweig’s intention was to prevent the return of the model phi-
losophia ancilla theologiae. Yet the question is delicate, because he 
located himself in the area of theology [SR: 151] and was motivated 
to “convert” philosophy to “new thinking”. Even in the fragment 
quoted above we read that philosophy “must accomplish” its task. 
But this imperative tone is unnecessary, and the whole project 
could still be defended if we accept a different style of discus-
sion, as well as some restrictions. Some of them were invented 
by Rosenzweig himself, although it seems that Arendt applied 
them better. 
Rosenzweig’s tone was exaggerated because he vehemently 
attacked idealism for its anti-theism. That is also why the the-
ological pretence is so strong. However, he admired Goethe’s 
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guardedness and was willing to appreciate “the arid silence of the 
unbelieving members” [SR: 314] as better guardians of enigma 
than garrulous believers. If this perspective is valid, then Arendt’s 
adaptation of the “narrowness” of the philosophical horizon 
could give religious content a new spirit – not necessarily and 
not directly, but it could prepare “the pre-conditions on which 
this content rests”. Nonetheless, in order for the secularity of the 
world separated from any cosmic sanctity to be guaranteed by 
a certain highly-speculative conception of God, and in order for 
human freedom to be defended theologically through the spark of 
the true sanctity deposited in natality, the pre-condition for this 
subtle operation must remain irrevocably enigmatic: 
God obviously wants only those who are free for his own. […] 
So he has no choice: he must tempt man; not only must he 
hide his ruling from him, he must even deceive him about it; 
he must make it difficult for him and even impossible to see it, 
so that man may have the opportunity to believe in him and 
to trust in him truly, that is, in freedom. [SR: 284]
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Rafał Zawisza
Clandestine Transmission: Rosenzweig and Arendt
The text deals with the question whether Hannah Arendt was influenced by 
Franz Rosenzweig’s Der Stern der Erlösung (1921) before writing Der Liebes-
begriff bei Augustin (1929). Instead of building general analogies, I studied 
two very specific topics – the world and birth – to demonstrate that Arendt 
repeated almost verbatim Rosenzweig’s entire peculiar argumentation 
which played the notions of God and nature against each other to combat 
their overwhelming power and to make room for the contingency of the 
world and the novelty of each birth.
Facing the helplessness of a  philosophy which ignored mortality, 
Rosenzweig cried out the lament of the finite being. Philosophy, with its 
predilection for totality, lost adequate proportions to reflect on life. Arendt 
revived this paradigmatic reorientation, but with a significant twist: for her, 
birth and the world meant more than God for Rosenzweig. Both thinkers 
projected a language between philosophy and theology, inciting the two 
idioms to a fruitful debate. 
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